Wealth transmission and inequality among hunter-gatherers by Wiessner, Pauline W. & Smith, Eric Alden
Current Anthropology Volume 51, Num ber 1, February 2010 19
Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and 
Inequality in Premodern Societies
Wealth Transmission and Inequality 
among Hunter-Gatherers
by Eric Alden Smith, Kim Hill, Frank W. Marlowe, David Nolin, Polly 
Wiessner, Michael Gurven, Samuel Bowles, Monique 
Borgerhoff Mulder, Tom Hertz, and Adrian Bell
CAH O nline-O nly Supplem ent: E stim ating the Inheritance of Wealth in Prem odern Societies
We report quantitative estimates of intergenerational transmission and population-wide inequality 
for wealth measures in a set of hunter-gatherer populations. Wealth is defined broadly as factors 
that contribute to individual or household well-being, ranging from embodied forms, such as weight 
and hunting success, to material forms, such as household goods, as well as relational wealth in 
exchange partners. Intergenerational wealth transmission is low to moderate in these populations 
but is still expected to have measurable influence on an individual’s life chances. Wealth inequality 
(measured with Gini coefficients) is moderate for most wealth types, matching what qualitative 
ethnographic research has generally indicated (if not the stereotype of hunter-gatherers as extreme 
egalitarians). We discuss some plausible mechanisms for these patterns and suggest ways in which 
future research could resolve questions about the role of wealth in hunter-gatherer social and eco­
nomic life.
In this article we characterize the main features and dimen­
sions of variation in wealth transmission in hunter-gatherer 
societies. We begin by defining the socioeconomic category 
“hunter-gatherer” as a production system. We then discuss 
wealth characteristics, wealth inheritance, and socioeconomic
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The next section provides ethnographic background and an 
outline of data collection methods for five sample populations 
(Ache, Iladza, Ju/’hoansi, Lamalerans, and Meriam). Here we 
also present quantitative results regarding various wealth cat­
egories and their importance, as well as intergenerational 
wealth transmission, for each of these societies (as well as one 
measure for the Tsimane, a horticultural-forager population 
discussed in more detail by Gurven et al. 2010, in this issue).
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The concluding section summarizes our findings on the mag­
nitude and patterning of intergenerational wealth transmis­
sion in the sample populations and discusses their relation 
to the broader set of hunter-gatherer societies.
H unter-G atherer Production  Systems
We define hunter-gatherer (forager) production systems as 
those that subsist primarily on undomesticated species of 
plants and animals, even if some domesticated species or their 
products are obtained through trade or ancillary cultivation. 
Degree of reliance on domesticates ranges along a continuum, 
with few if any extant societies at zero. Ethnographies and 
cross-cultural databases, however, do describe a large sample 
of societies with total or near-total dependence on foraging 
(table 1).
Ethnographically described hunter-gatherers constitute a 
numerically small but theoretically crucial set of societies. If 
our species is some 200,000 years old, then the strictly hunt­
ing-gathering phase occupied well over 90% of its history; 
societies relying primarily or even exclusively on foraging per­
sisted in various parts of the globe well into the twentieth 
century. Both ethnographic and archaeological records testify 
to considerable diversity in these societies, and contemporary 
foragers are by no means survivals of some unchanged Pa­
leolithic lifeway (Kelly 1995). This diversity encompasses eco­
logical, demographic, economic, sociopolitical, and ideolog­
ical variation, to the point that some have questioned how 
meaningful the “hunter-gatherer” label can be (as reviewed
in Kelly 1995). We find the category too useful to abandon 
but recognize the need for distinctions within it.
Focusing on ethnographically described hunter-gatherers, 
we can differentiate smaller, more mobile societies—whose 
members reside in camps or villages of a few dozen people 
or less, engage in considerable residential mobility, and lack 
formal hereditary political officials—from larger, more sed­
entary groups with year-round or seasonal villages and he­
reditary social and political ranking. This distinction is less 
typological (as the defining variables are continuous rather 
than categorical) and more easily related to wealth transmis­
sion than are distinctions such as immediate return/delayed 
return (Woodburn 1982) or forager/collector (Binford 1980). 
Residential mobility in a large sample of hunter-gatherers 
ranges from 0 to 58 moves per year, with a mean of 7.4 and 
a median of 5.5 (table 1). In the smaller but more geograph­
ically representative sample of foraging societies in the Stan­
dard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock and White 1980), 
more than two-thirds are classed as “nomadic” or “semi- 
nomadic” and less than a tenth as “sedentary” (table 2). We 
have removed equestrian societies and a few primarily hor­
ticultural cases from the data sets summarized in table 1. 
While recognizing that most cross-cultural databases suffer 
to various degrees from problems of reliability, representa­
tiveness, and sampling bias, our hope is that the patterns they 
reveal are meaningful if not terribly precise.
Although the diversity encompassed in the foraging pro­
duction system is great, it has its limits. Constraints on the 
degree to which resource productivity can be intensified, plus
Table 1. Summary characteristics of ethnographically described hunter-gatherer societies (from 
Marlowe 2005 unless otherwise indicated)
Variable Average Median Range Cases4
Population density (per km2) .30 .12 A o T o 312
Total fertility rate (live births/woman) 5.4 5.5 .8-8.5 47
Residential group size 41.4 27 13-250 263
Residential group mobility (moves/year) 7.4 5.5 0-58 312
Dietary reliance on wild resources (%) 99.4 100 80-100 367
Gathering 36.3 40 0-90 367
Hunting 30.8 30 0-89 367
Fishing 32.3 25 0-95 367
Males married polygynously (%) 14.1 10 0-70 212
Females married polygynously (%) 21.4 10 0-90 51
Postmarital residence1’ 193
Patrilocal/virilocal (%) 51.3 99
Matrilocal/uxorilocal (%) 14.5 28





Ambilineal or double descent 11.1 4
aNumber of societies or populations in the sample for a given variable; equestrian cases excluded. 
bResidence data from table 7.2 of Kelly (1995).
cDescent data from Marlowe (2004), using the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample.
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Table 2. Summary characteristics of hunter-gatherer societies in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCSS)
Variable” Categories (societies)b
Residential mobility (V150) Nomadic: 32% (12); seminomadic: 39% (15); semisedentary: 21% (8); sedentary: 8% (3)
Land ownership (V1726) Predominantly private: 8% (2); partially communal: 16% (4); communal only: 76% (19)
Land inheritance (V278) No individual inheritance: 90% (28); matrilineal: 3% (1); patrilineal: 6% (2)
Movable property inheritance (V279) No individual inheritance: 35% (10); matrilineal: 7% (2); patrilineal: 45% (13); bilateral: 14% (4)
Social stratification (V158) Egalitarian: 68% (26); hereditary slavery: 24% (9); social classes: 8% (3)
Primary sources of political power (V93) Subsistence production: 82% (31); political or religious office: 11% (4); warfare booty: 5% (2);
trade: 3% (1)
““Vn" indicates variable number in the SCSS (Divale, Khaltourina, and Korotayev 2002; Murdock and White 1980).
bPercent (number) of hunter-gatherer societies in the sample for a given variable. Percentage is calculated on cases with data available (excluding 
missing cases from the denominator). Societies were selected when V858 (predominant subsistence) was listed as hunting, gathering, fishing, or 
anadromous fishing (types 1-4).
exclusion from many resource-rich habitats (by agricultural 
peoples), results in lower population densities and much 
smaller camps or villages than is typical of horticultural and 
agricultural populations (see table 1; compare with Gurven 
et al. 2010 and Shenk et al. 2010, in this issue). Comparative 
analyses of fertility have demonstrated that forager popula­
tions have somewhat lower fertility rates than agricultural (but 
not necessarily horticultural or pastoral) populations (Bentley, 
Goldberg, and Jasienska 1993; Sellen and Mace 1997). This 
difference has, in turn, been ascribed to the effects of lower 
mobility and more early-weaning foods in agricultural pop­
ulations; however, detailed cross-cultural analysis shows that 
agropastoral populations do not differ from foragers in wean- 
ing-food availability or average age at weaning but do have 
earlier onset of weaning (Sellen 2007; Sellen and Smay 2001). 
Juvenile survival rates are also lower in well-studied forager 
populations than in horticultural and pastoral ones (Gurven 
and Kaplan 2007).
W ealth and Inequality in H unter- 
G atherer Societies
As detailed in Bowles, Smith, and Borgerhoff Mulder (2010, 
in this issue; see also Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009), we define 
wealth as any attribute of an individual that contributes to a 
flow of valued goods or services. This broad definition is 
subdivided into “wealth classes” (embodied, material, and 
relational wealth), each encompassing various “wealth types” 
(e.g., hunting success, household goods, and sharing part­
nerships), as detailed below.
Our collective judgment, based on many years of field re­
search and the published ethnographic corpus, is that in most 
foraging societies, variation in material wealth has less effect 
on well-being than does variation in other forms of wealth, 
such as health or social connections. This generalization is 
more likely to hold for mobile, low-density foragers (which 
constitute the great majority of ethnographically described 
foraging societies; see tables 1, 2) than for sedentary, high- 
density foragers. There are at least three reasons for this. First, 
high mobility reduces the possibility or profitability of in­
vestment in land or fixed facilities (e.g., weirs, permanent 
houses). Accordingly, land ownership among high-mobility 
groups is overwhelmingly communal and cannot be trans­
mitted to individuals or kin groups (table 2). Second, reduced 
mobility depends on dense and predictable resource patches 
(e.g., salmon streams), and access to these patches is often 
controlled by kin groups or other subsets of the population; 
if variation in patch productivity is great enough, those who 
control the richest patches can exchange access to them for 
economic and political services (Boone 1992; Smith and Choi 
2007). When resource abundance is less concentrated, access 
is harder to control; individuals can therefore resist any moves 
toward institutionalized inequality, including “voting with 
their feet” to relocate elsewhere if necessary. Finally, mobility 
makes it harder to accumulate material property. Moveable 
material property, such as tools, clothing, and valuables, is 
generally treated as individual property and is often trans­
mitted to descendant kin (table 2). In most foraging societies, 
however, such property can usually be manufactured by any 
adult of the appropriate gender or obtained fairly readily; 
exceptions include items involving highly specialized manu­
facture or obtained through limited trade contacts, as well as 
wealth and prestige goods in some sedentary, less egalitarian 
societies.
Most adults in hunter-gatherer societies actively contribute 
to food production and processing as well as tool manufacture 
and maintenance. In addition, child care and provisioning 
are generally parental duties. Most of these forms of labor 
require considerable strength and stamina, visual acuity, and 
other aspects of good health. As a result, we expect somatic 
wealth to be of prime importance to success and well-being. 
On the other hand, those who suffer periodically from sub- 
optimal somatic endowments can usually rely on aid from 
others in the form of food sharing, assistance with child care, 
and protection in disputes. This social insurance is normative 
and widely available, but some evidence suggests that the 
quality of such aid will vary according to the “relational 
wealth” (reputation, size, and quality of the social network) 
of the needy individual or household (Gurven et al. 2000; 
Nolin 2008; Wiessner 2002).
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Table 3. Descriptive features of project populations in comparison to other hunter-gatherers
Population Population density” Mobility (moves/year)1’ Residential group size Reliance on fishing Reliance on hunting
Ache .04 75-100 43.4 Low High
Hadza .24 7 29.3 None Moderate
Ju/’hoansi .07 5.5 17.4 None Moderate
Lamalera 67.40 0 1,200 High High
Meriam 86.00 0 430 High Low
Average 30.75 20.0 344.1
Marlowe database' .30 7.4 41.4 32.3% 30.8%
“Density in people/km2, as compiled by Marlowe (2005) or observed by project ethnographers (published work or personal communication). 
’’Observed moves per year of camp or village (sources as above).
cWith exceptions noted in “Hunter-Gatherer Production Systems” and footnote a of table 1.
Knowledge presents some special difficulties. Information 
needed to successfully harvest resources and process them 
into food or other goods is widely available (on a gender- 
specific basis), although some exceptions apply, particularly 
in more sedentary foraging societies (e.g., manufacture of 
complex watercraft). Knowledge concerning ritual practices 
and trading partnerships, however, is often more differentially 
distributed. Commonly, certain individuals have esoteric 
knowledge held to be useful in curing illness, combating sor­
cery, or predicting weather and availability of game. Although 
relatively few hunter-gatherer societies have well-defined so­
cial strata or politico-religious offices (table 2), our impression 
is that the great majority do recognize important differences 
in specialized realms of knowledge, differences that may have 
status correlates and yet coexist with normative and de facto 
egalitarianism in other forms of wealth (e.g., Bird and Bliege 
Bird 2009).
In sum, a primary constraint on material-wealth accu­
mulation and inequality in hunter-gatherer societies is the 
degree of residential mobility, which in turn is heavily influ­
enced by spatiotemporal resource variability (Cashdan 1992; 
Kelly 1995). Generalizations about wealth and inequality dif­
fer greatly, depending on whether one focuses on the more 
mobile low-density foragers or on the smaller set of sedentary, 
high-density foragers; the latter, after all, includes societies 
(e.g., Northwest Coast, Calusa) with slavery, hereditary no­
bility, stores of durable valuables, and other features strongly 
related to intergenerational wealth transmission.
Ethnographic Sample and M ethods
Overview of Sample Populations
The five populations discussed and analyzed in detail below 
include the Ache of South America, the Hadza and the 
Ju/’hoansi of sub-Saharan Africa, the Lamalerans of southeast 
Asia, and the Meriam of Melanesia. In addition, we provide 
an analysis of hunting-return rates among the Tsimane, a 
South American horticulturalist-forager society discussed at 
length by Gurven et al. (2010).
Three of these populations (Ache, Hadza, and Ju/’hoansi) 
are clearly at the low-density, high-mobility end of the scale,
with values in these measures, as well as residential group 
size, close to the averages for a large sample of foragers (table 
3), although Ache in the presettlement period have very high 
estimated residential mobility. In contrast, two populations 
are very sedentary and (for foragers) of high density: La­
malerans (coastal sea hunters) and Meriam (coastal fisher- 
horticulturalists), each inhabiting one large village. It is note­
worthy that the two high-density populations are character­
ized by high reliance on marine resources, a pattern found 
in larger samples of forager populations (tables 6-2, 6-4 in 
Kelly 1995; figs. 4, 5 in Marlowe 2005). However, even the 
Lamalerans and Meriam display relatively low levels of so­
cioeconomic inequality, compared to some other sedentary 
coastal foragers, such as Northwest Coast Indians, Chumash, 
or Calusa.
Ache
Ethnographic background. The Northern Ache lived as isolated 
hunter-gatherers in the tropical forests of eastern Paraguay 
until peaceful contacts with outsiders in the 1970s. At first 
contact the population contained 557 individuals, scattered 
in a dozen or more residential bands of flexible composition 
roaming a region of about 20,000 km2. The traditional econ­
omy was based on hunting medium-sized mammals (about 
80% of all calories came from armadillos, paca, white-lipped 
peccaries, capuchin monkeys, and tapir) with bow and arrow, 
extracting palm starch and hearts (about 10% of all calories), 
and collecting larvae, honey, and fruits (about 10% of all 
calories). Residential bands were highly cooperative, with in­
dividuals regularly adopting complementary roles in food ac­
quisition through the day (Hill 2002) and sharing all game 
and a good portion of other foods among most band members 
(Kaplan and Hill 1985). Band members also regularly cared 
for each other’s children and freely exchanged or provided a 
variety of goods and services. Only mate acquisition was 
markedly competitive rather than cooperative.
Ache residential bands ideally centered around a father and 
his adult sons, but in practice bands often consisted of bi­
lateral kin (a core set of brothers, or brothers and sisters, their 
children, some affinal kin, etc.). Membership in these bands
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changed frequently, although core sets of kin were almost 
always together. Bands had no formal leadership; there were 
no ritual or ceremonial divisions and no marriage prescrip­
tions or proscriptions other than avoidance of all first cousins. 
Club fights were organized as a form of ritual combat between 
men with grudges, and close kin alliances often determined 
“teams” of combatants. Status was attained through killing 
others, hunting skill, and personal charisma related to oratory 
skills and emotional connections. Women participated in de­
cisions but did not wield influence equal to that of men, and 
they were often quite subservient. Their main activities were 
intensive child care (the forest contains many mortal dangers 
for small children), transportation of family goods, and ex­
traction of palm products.
After contact in the 1970s, the Northern Ache, along with 
three other independent dialect groups of Ache, were relo­
cated to six reservation settlements. Three of these, near the 
Mbaracayu forest reserve, have been intensively studied. The 
reservation economy is based on subsistence farming (man­
ioc, maize, beans, peanuts, melons, etc.) and frequent treks 
into the forest. A few individuals are engaged in nearby wage 
labor (or teach school). More details on general aspects of 
Ache ethnography are available in other publications (e.g., 
Hill 1994; Hill and Hurtado 1996, 1999), and approximately 
130 publications on the behavioral ecology of the Ache are 
available at Kim Hill’s research Web site (http://www.public 
.asu.edu/~krhill3/Publica tions.html).
Wealth measures. Ache “wealth” can be conceptualized in 
three dimensions. First, some individuals produce more re­
sources on a consistent basis (higher income), and when alone 
or in small camps, they and their families experience higher 
resource consumption. If excess production is shared in a 
partially contingent fashion, high producers may also obtain 
a greater share of the valuable contributions of other band 
members (including food but also other goods and services). 
But differential access to the goods and services of others 
(including reproductive access) can also be attained through 
high-quality social relationships, which constitute a second, 
nonmaterial form of Ache wealth. Finally, both production 
levels and social relationships are affected by embodied wealth 
(body size, health, cognitive ability, etc.), which also affects 
basic fitness components, such as mortality and fertility rates. 
Thus, transmissible wealth comes in the form of somatic en­
dowment, productive ability, and social relationships, all of 
which are potentially heritable.
Body weight is a good measure of somatic endowment 
because growth is an indicator of childhood disease resistance 
and because body size associates positively with productive 
potential and fertility in mammals (Hill and Hurtado 1996). 
Ache weight has been repeatedly measured with an electronic 
bathroom scale since 1980. The body weights of all individuals 
who were measured when over age 18 were employed for 
analyses. Parental weight was defined as the average of 
mother’s and father’s weights, with controls for single parents 
as well as for age and sex of offspring (see the CA+ online
supplement “Estimating the Inheritance of Wealth in Pre­
modern Societies” in the online edition of Current Anthro­
pology for details).
Hunting-return rates are the best measure of variability in 
overall food production for Ache men (there is no equivalent 
measurement for women). We have monitored the hunting 
success of Ache men in three communities since 1980. Early 
data were derived from direct observation by focal follows. 
Return rates in more recent years are based on informant- 
reported hunting success in weekly systematic interviews. All 
data were converted to a daily return rate (kilograms of game 
live weight per day of hunting), and the average was calculated 
for each man during each 5-year period from 1980 to 2007 
(Hill and Kintigh 2009). Five-year averages were plotted by 
mean age of each hunter during the period and then 
smoothed with a Lowess regression in order to determine the 
age shape of the hunting-returns function. The residual of 
each man’s average from the Lowess age curve was then used 
to calculate how much above or below the typical hunting 
returns (in kg/day) each man was for his age. The residuals 
from each 5-year period for each man were then averaged 
over his lifetime to get a measure of how good a hunter he 
had been for his age during the entire 27 years of monitoring. 
Son’s-age residuals of hunting-return rate were regressed on 
father’s-age residuals in order to determine whether men who 
were good hunters for their age had sons who are also good 
hunters for their age. These estimates were also corrected for 
measurement error; reliability was determined by comparing 
many-period averages (which were available for some hunt­
ers) to averages over subsets of the full period. The overall 
reliability of the hunting data was estimated to be 0.68.
Hadza
Ethnographic background. The Hadza live in a savanna-wood- 
land habitat around Lake Eyasi, south of Ngorongoro Crater 
and Serengeti National Park in northern Tanzania. Our best 
estimate of the population is 1,000 (Jones, Hawkes, and 
O’Connell 2002). Hadza live in camps that average 30 people 
and change location about every 1.5 months; people often 
visit or move to other camps as well. This fluid movement 
helps explain Hadza egalitarianism; when anyone tries to boss 
others around, the latter simply move away from the bossy 
person (Woodburn 1982). The most common form of Hadza 
camp consists of two or three sisters and their families; when 
their mother is alive, she is likely to also reside in the same 
camp (Jones, Hawkes, and O’Connell 2005; Woodburn 1964).
The Hadza are central-place provisioners (Marlowe 2006). 
They often feed themselves while foraging but also take food 
back to camp. Women gather fruit and berries and dig tubers, 
usually in groups of three to eight, plus some children. Be­
cause all women in a foraging party tend to have a haul of 
the same foods, most of their food may go to their own 
households, but often it is shared with anyone in camp. Once 
back in camp, women roast some of their tubers to feed all
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the children present or send them to a group of men sitting 
in the men’s place. Men collect honey and use bows and 
arrows to hunt a wide range of game, from small (e.g., rock 
hyrax) to large (e.g., giraffe). Men usually hunt alone. Once 
an animal is hit, the hunter may return to camp and get other 
men to help him track the wounded animal. When men bring 
honey back to camp, it is often shared with those present, 
but unlike larger game, it can sometimes be concealed and 
directed to a man’s household (Marlowe 2003). When men 
bring medium-sized and large game into camp, it is shared 
widely across households (Hawkes, O’Connell, and Jones 
2001a; Woodburn 1998), but even small game and honey are 
often shared widely. Despite the widespread sharing, on av­
erage the portion of a hunter’s catch retained in his household 
is larger than the share given to each other household (B. M. 
Wood and F. W. Marlowe, unpublished manuscript).
Hadza have no land or property inheritance or accumulated 
material wealth. Even though the group is extremely egali­
tarian, men who are the best hunters have slightly more pres­
tige as well as more surviving offspring (Hawkes, O’Connell, 
and Jones 2001a, 2001 fe; Marlowe 1999, 2003). They achieve 
the latter not by having more wives over time but by having 
a higher chance of marrying young women upon divorce 
(Marlowe 2000). Hadza women usually acquire a great deal 
of food well into their seventies. Hawkes, O’Connell, and 
Jones (2001 b) found that children’s growth rates were pre­
dicted by their mothers’ food returns rather than by their 
fathers’ food returns. They concluded that better hunters 
achieve their greater reproductive success (RS) by marrying 
better gatherers. However, their sample was small and covered 
only 12 months. In a preliminary analysis of a much larger 
data set, there is no evidence that husbands and wives are 
assortatively mated with regard to foraging returns. When 
stepfathers are excluded, men do bring in more food when 
they have more dependants (Marlowe 1999, 2003).
Wealth measures. The wealth measures used here are weight, 
grip strength, and foraging success. These measures get at 
biological traits that might be relevant for other traits that 
could be counted as social capital, such as foraging skills. The 
anthropometric data were taken on all people in camp, and 
many people were measured more than once per year over 
the years 2001-2006. Stature and weight were measured by 
previous researchers, and there has been little or no change 
in the Hadza over the years (Hiernaux and Hartono 1980; 
Jones 2006; Marlowe and Berbesque 2009). Weight was mea­
sured with a Tanita bioelectrical impedance scale, and grip 
strength was measured with a dynamometer. Strength appears 
to be important among the Hadza. Women need strength to 
dig tubers; men need it to pull larger bows, which send arrows 
to their target faster, and to chop into trees to access honey. 
Both sexes need to carry heavy loads of food (and often 
children) long distances. Weight and strength, which are cor­
related, account for much of the effect that age alone has on 
these skills. Weight predicted kilograms of tubers acquired per
hour by women, men, and children, and strength was cor­
related with archery skill for males (Jones and Marlowe 2002).
Foraging success was measured for a composite of all for­
aging activity. The raw data are a person’s sum total of all 
foods brought back to camp per observation day. The weight 
of foods brought into camp was converted to kilocalories to 
compute a foraging-productivity score (mean daily kilocal­
ories) for each camp resident: men, women, and children. 
During the observation periods, almost all women and all 
men went out from camp to forage every day, women for an 
average of about 4 hours and men for about 6 hours. The 
measure of parent-offspring correspondence in foraging suc­
cess reported here excludes mother-daughter pairs, because 
they usually dug tubers together and thus including them 
would overestimate actual correspondences.
Jufhoansi
Ethnographic background. The Ju/’hoansi Bushmen of the Kal­
ahari Desert are one of the most thoroughly egalitarian so­
cieties known in the ethnographic record, enforcing both 
“equality of opportunity” as young people start out in life 
and “equality of outcome” throughout the life cycle. Those 
who seek to possess more material goods, food, or status are 
leveled by other group members (Lee 1979; Wiessner 2005). 
Nonetheless, those who excel in hunting, healing, hxaro ex­
change, and social skills and return benefits to the groups are 
recognized as //haiha (//aihadi for women), which can be 
glossed as “one who has things” or “leader” (Wiessner 2002).
The Ju/’hoansi population of some 2,000 considered here 
inhabits northwestern Botswana and northeastern Namibia 
(Biesele 1993; Howell 2000; Lee 1979; Lee and DeVore 1976; 
Marshall 1976; Shostak 1981; Wilmsen 1989). Until the mid- 
1970s, Ju/’hoansi subsisted primarily through foraging. When 
living as foragers, the Ju/’hoan bands inhabited territories with 
enough food and water to sustain a band in the average year. 
Each Ju/’hoan man and woman inherited access to the ter­
ritory of his or her mother and father and could claim a 
strong hold by assembling kin with similar rights to jointly 
occupy the land. Spatial and temporal variation in resources, 
including the availability of water, was high. To buffer them­
selves from environmental and social risks, the Ju/’hoansi 
engaged in a system of exchange called hxaro, a delayed ex­
change of gifts indicating an underlying relationship of com­
mitment to mutual support in times of need.
Wealth measures. The wealth measure used here is number 
of hxaro partners, a measure of relational wealth. On average, 
the Ju/’hoansi in the early 1970s had 16 hxaro partners (range 
2-42), who were well distributed in space within a radius of 
200 km and over different ages, sexes, and abilities. When in 
need, a person would pack up his or her family, visit a partner, 
and reside in that camp for as long as necessary. Census data 
collected by Richard Lee and Polly Wiessner indicate that 93% 
of all recorded extended visits were made to hxaro partners 
and that, on average, 3.3 months a year were spent living in
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the camps of partners (Wiessner 1981, 1982). Hxaro part­
nerships were usually formed with consanguineous kin; they 
were inherited from either parent or formed during a lifetime 
with siblings, cousins, aunts and uncles, and so on, but only 
with affines in exceptional cases. Because of rules for exogamy, 
it was extremely rare that spouses shared the same hxaro 
partners.
Spheres of hxaro waxed and waned throughout the life 
cycle. Young people began their reproductive career with an 
average of 13 partnerships, enough to see them through hard 
times. When the first of their children matured to marriage­
able age, Ju/’hoansi doubled their spheres of hxaro, to an 
average of 24 partners. With old age and decreased mobility 
and productive capacity, elders’ hxaro spheres narrowed to 
an average of 12 partners. Partnerships could be passed to 
children by parents as they aged or at their funerals, when 
their children would take some of their possessions, give them 
to one of the deceased’s partners, and ask that the relationship 
be continued. Ju/’hoansi marriages were arranged, and hxaro 
played a major role in locating spouses and contracting mar­
riages. Hxaro partnerships were linked together to form chains 
that wound for hundreds of kilometers through the Kalahari 
and tapped into the broader trade networks of southern Af­
rica. Ju/’hoansi who were well connected in hxaro had a better 
chance of acquiring desired material possessions from afar.
Data on hxaro ties were collected from 59 individuals in 
three randomly selected villages, including both residents and 
visitors to the village who stayed for weeks or months during 
the four-month period of the study. Individuals were first 
asked to list all of their hxaro partners, their name, sex, age, 
marital status, kin relation to ego, area of land rights, and 
current residence. Subsequently, individuals in the sample 
were asked to lay out all of their worldly possessions and 
discuss how they had obtained each one. Of 1,483 possessions 
recorded, 69% were received in hxaro from listed partners, 
27% were recently bought or made, and 4% were received 
from non-Bushmen or Bushmen who were not hxaro part­
ners. Number of hxaro partners correlated with number of 
possessions owned by the individual, number of possible al­
ternative residences, hunting success for men, ability as a 
healer, and social competence (Wiessner 2002).
Lamalera
Ethnographic background. Lamalera is a village of just over 
1,200 people and about 317 households located on the island 
of Lembata in southeastern Indonesia. In the past, Lamalera 
might have been characterized as a complex foraging society. 
A permanent resident population subsisted almost entirely by 
maritime foraging and trading with agricultural villages of the 
interior. Differences in material wealth among households 
were likely less pronounced in the past than they are now, 
but status differences existed. Two autochthonous clans and 
three founding clans claimed greater status and authority than 
the other clans, which, according to tradition, arrived later.
This created a broad, horizontal hierarchy among clans. A 
man’s social status was tied to that of his clan or to his 
personal prowess as a hunter (Alvard and Gillespie 2004) and 
his material success to that of his lineage, whose members 
cooperatively operated a whaling boat, or tina. (Alvard 2003; 
Alvard and Nolin 2002).
In the early 1900s, the Catholic Church brought formal 
education to the village (Barnes 1996). With this development, 
Lamalerans were well positioned to take advantage of op­
portunities in the expanding Dutch (and later Indonesian) 
civil administrative infrastructure. Expansion of the wage la­
bor market outside the village brought further opportunities. 
The consequent emigration has been a feature of Lamaleran 
demography for most of the past century (Barnes 1986). The 
traditional authority structure among clans continues to dom­
inate the internal affairs of the village. However, there is now 
more social differentiation among individual families, based 
on success of kin outside the village. Despite these changes, 
in 2006 the economy within the village remained largely a 
subsistence economy of fishing and hunting. Aside from 
school teaching and a handful of government posts, there 
were no wage labor opportunities within the village.
Wealth measures. Four wealth measures are available for 
Lamalera: household wealth, sharing-network ties, boat 
shares, and RS. Household wealth is an indication of the 
household’s access to money and can also be interpreted as 
a proximate measure of the household’s connection to the 
market economy. Household wealth is measured on an eight- 
point Mokken scale based on features of residents’ homes (see 
Nolin 2008). Houses are traditionally inherited by the youn­
gest son, unless the house is the lineage’s great house, in which 
case the oldest son has the right of inheritance. However, in 
2006 most houses (70%) had been built by their current 
occupants. Neolocality has long been encouraged by the 
Church, and a house is considered by most to be a prerequisite 
for marriage. Young unmarried men often pursue wage labor 
opportunities in regional towns to save money for the con­
struction of a home. Parents may also contribute to these 
costs, if able, as may emigrant kin. Remittances from suc­
cessful emigrant siblings or offspring may also be an impor­
tant source of cash for later improvements to the house. Cor­
relations between parents’ and a child’s household wealth may 
therefore be due to similar access to outside remittances rather 
than to transfers of wealth from the parents to the child.
Sharing ties to and from a household are an indication of 
how well the household is buffered against harvest variance. 
In addition, the people with whom one has established sharing 
relationships may also be those on whom one can rely for 
other forms of aid. In this respect, sharing-network ties may 
be a proxy for one’s broader support network. The measure 
used here sums together the number of other households to 
whom the focal household usually gives food (its out-degree) 
and the number of other households from whom the focal 
household usually receives food (its in-degree). These data 
were collected by household census in 2006. Secondary shar­
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ing in Lamalera is completely discretionary. There are no 
formally recognized sharing partnerships, such as are found 
in some other societies, and therefore no sharing roles to 
inherit. However, parents and children may have similarly 
sized sharing networks for a number of reasons. First, they 
are kin to the same people, and since sharing occurs more 
commonly among kin, this may lead to similar network ties. 
Second, when children reside near their parents, they may 
share with the same neighboring nonrelatives. Finally, parents 
and children have similar access to resources, which may make 
them similarly attractive to others as sharing partners and 
similarly able to give to others.
Household boat shares were calculated as the sum of shares 
in boats held by all residents of a household. Shares can vary 
in size, depending on the type of shares, the number of holders 
of that share type, and the prey type caught (see Alvard 2002 
for discussion), but here they are counted as single units. 
Shares in whaling boats remain the primary source of food 
for most Lamaleran households. Obtaining such shares de­
pends largely on kinship, but being able to contribute to boat 
maintenance, as well as having the support of other share­
holders, may also be important factors. Shares are inherited 
by the surviving spouse, provided there is one. Otherwise, the 
shareholder’s resident sons divide the share. These rights per­
sist only until share rights are reallocated, which happens 
periodically, when the boat undergoes refurbishment. Boats 
are owned by lineages, and adult members of the owning 
lineage may secure a share at this time by contributing to the 
costs of refurbishment. Those who already hold a boat share 
are also expected to contribute, if able, in order to retain their 
share. Some roles in the boat (boat master, harpooner, master 
carpenter) are nominally heritable, but if an heir shows no 
interest, then someone else may take the role.
For Lamalera, RS was defined as the number of offspring 
surviving to at least 1 year. Reproductive histories were col­
lected in 2006 for all current household heads and their 
spouses. Respondents were specifically asked about deceased 
children and were asked to provide ages of death. Infant and 
child mortality is high in Lamalera, so living offspring aged 
less than 1 year were discounted by the probability of sur­
viving to 1 year.
Meriam
Ethnographic background. Mer (aka Murray Island) is a small 
island in Torres Strait, between mainland Australia and Papua 
New Guinea. Meriam, the indigenous residents of Mer and 
adjacent islands, have linguistic, genetic, and cultural links to 
the south coast of Papua New Guinea and to Melanesia more 
broadly. The island’s 1998 population was 430 individuals of 
Meriam descent, residing in approximately 85 households 
(plus a handful of temporary non-Meriam residents). The 
Torres Strait as a whole is administered by the State of Queens­
land and the Commonwealth of Australia. Although many 
Meriam men had long been engaged in industries in Australia
(especially pearling, sugarcane, and railroads), until about 
1975, when Australian welfare payments were first made avail­
able to all indigenous Australians, the Meriam on the islands 
were nearly full-time subsistence horticulturalists and marine 
foragers. Subsistence revolved around planting tropical yams, 
bananas, sugarcane, coconuts, and introduced New World 
crops such as manioc, sweet potatoes, and corn and harvesting 
marine fish, shellfish, and sea turtles. Today, horticulture is 
nearly moribund, and carbohydrates and other goods are 
readily purchased at the community store. Yet fishing, hunt­
ing, and shellfish collecting remain critical components of 
Meriam subsistence economy: mean daily per capita con­
sumption rates in 1998 averaged 630 kilocalories of meat and 
40 grams of protein. More than 80% of these calories were 
supplied by turtle during the nesting season. (For additional 
ethnographic description, see Beckett 1988; Bliege Bird and 
Bird 1997; Haddon 1906; Sharp 1993.)
Success in turtle hunting plays an important role in status 
differences among Meriam men. Hunting of green sea turtles 
(Chelonia mydas) occurs throughout the year but particularly 
during the nonnesting season (May-September). Hunting is 
a cooperative, entirely male pursuit with distinct roles: youn­
ger men serve as crew members or “jumpers” (arpeir le) under 
the direction of the hunt leaders (ariemer le), who are gen­
erally older, with more skill and experience, and are ultimately 
held responsible for the success or failure of hunts. Typically, 
turtles obtained through hunting (as contrasted with turtles 
collected on the beach during the nesting season) are dis­
tributed to multiple households or to islandwide feasts, and 
the hunters receive no material recompense (Bliege Bird, 
Smith, and Bird 2001; Bliege Bird et al. 2002; Smith and Bliege 
Bird 2000; Smith, Bliege Bird, and Bird 2003).
Wealth measures. Meriam have complex rules of land own­
ership and inheritance involving both patrilineal clans and 
some land inheritance by unmarried daughters (or other des­
ignated female heirs). However, detailed land ownership data 
for a representative sample of Meriam are not available; in 
addition, with the near cessation of horticulture in recent 
years, the effects of land inheritance on other social and eco­
nomic variables is likely much diminished. Inheritance of 
other substantial material property is for the most part a very 
recent phenomenon, as permanent housing and other durable 
goods have not been widespread until the past several decades; 
the prime exception to this would be prized double-outrigger 
canoes, but these have been displaced by motorboats.
The only wealth measure used here is male RS, measured 
as number of children alive at time of data collection (1998), 
regardless of age. It is customary to adjust for early-childhood 
mortality by measuring only offspring surviving to at least 
age 5; however, because residents of Mer have access to a 
staffed medical clinic and fairly rapid air evacuation to a 
hospital, such mortality is relatively low: ca. 6% cumulative 
mortality to age 5 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2005). There is some artificial contraception practiced, but 
incidence data are not available; Meriam birth rates have been
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relatively low before access to such technology, for at least a 
century (Haddon 1901-1935).
Results and Discussion
Wealth Classes and Their Importance
After considerable group discussion, each researcher esti­
mated a value for each of the major wealth classes (embodied, 
material, and relational) in the population she/he studied. 
These values, which we label a, are defined as the percentage 
change in a family’s well-being associated with a percentage 
change in the wealth class in question, holding other wealth 
classes constant at the average level. The a  estimates are frac­
tions that sum to unity, reflecting their derivation from the 
Cobb-Douglas production function (see Gurven et al. 2010 
for details). The estimates for our five focal hunter-gatherer 
populations are provided in table 4. Note that the a  values 
are not statistical estimates based on measurements but rather 
judgments of each researcher based on months or years of 
fieldwork with each respective population.
The researchers generally agreed that relational wealth is of 
greatest importance, but beyond that there is no clear con­
sensus (table 4). However, the relative a  values for embodied 
and material wealth roughly correspond to the position of 
these five societies along the mobility/density continuum, with 
the most mobile populations (Ache, Hadza) having high val­
ues for embodied and very low values for material wealth, 
the sedentary/high-density populations roughly equal a ’s for 
these two categories of wealth, and the Ju/’hoansi grouping 
with the sedentary populations despite their low density and 
relatively high mobility (table 4). Ju/’hoansi place considerable 
emphasis on ties to particular homelands (n!ore) to which 
they have foraging rights based on kinship and residence (Lee 
1979; Wiessner 2002; also see above), a form of (communal) 
material wealth; in contrast, Ache and Hadza practice much 
more open-access foraging on their lands.
Intergenerational Wealth Transmission
As discussed by Bowles, Smith, and Borgerhoff Mulder 
(2010), we measure intergenerational wealth transmission 
with the unit-free coefficient (3, which estimates the “elas­
ticity” in wealth for parent-offspring pairs, or the percentage 
change in wealth in the second generation associated with a 
1% change in parental wealth. Table 5 presents these wealth- 
transmission measures by wealth type for each of the five 
focal populations (plus one measure for Tsimane, otherwise 
treated in Gurvern et al. 2010). Sample sizes vary substantially, 
tending to be larger for more easily measured variables, and 
range from 26 parent-offspring pairs to nearly 200. The 
method of calculating /3 requires comparable information on 
parents and offspring and sometimes sex-specific pairings. 
Censoring due to death before study or to emigration from 
the study area leaves many unpaired individuals.
We have eight measures of four types of embodied wealth
Table 4. Estimates of a  exponents for hunter-gatherer 




Ache .50 .05 .45
Hadza .70 .00 .30
Ju/’hoansi .35 .25 .40
Lamalera .35 .25 .40
Meriam .40 .20 .40
Average .46 .15 .39
from five populations: weight, grip strength, RS, and foraging 
success. In contrast, material wealth is represented by only 
two measures (shares in whaling-boat harvest and an index 
of housing quality), both from Lamalera. Similarly, relational 
wealth is represented by only two measures, exchange (hxaro) 
partners among Ju/’hoansi and food-sharing partners in La­
malera. Given this very uneven representation, it is not rea­
sonable to make statistical comparisons between wealth classes 
for just the hunter-gatherer cases; instead, see Smith et al. 
(2010, in this issue), where measures from the full set of 
societies can be compared.
We can, however, offer interpretations of particular wealth 
measures in individual societies. With regard to intergener­
ational transmission of hunting skills, the Ache results show 
no relationship between fathers’ and sons’ age-corrected hunt- 
ing-return rates (fig. 1A). This might seem surprising, since 
men do inherit the genetic component of their father’s so­
matic traits (body size, strength, athleticism, intelligence, etc.), 
which should have some impact on hunting success. However, 
all Ache boys hunt with many different men, receive little or 
no formal instruction from their fathers, and often do not 
live with biological fathers during teen years. Thus, the lack 
of a relationship between the hunting success of fathers and 
that of sons is not a complete surprise. Ache men whom Hill 
has interviewed suggest that most of their skill came from 
their own practice during teen years in the forest and from 
listening to stories by other men as well as from observing 
the hunting process (but not necessarily with their fathers as 
models). The similar measure for the Hadza (foraging success) 
includes gathering as well as hunting and females as well as 
males (although mother-daughter pairs are excluded from the 
calculated ,8, for reasons explained above); it also is close to 
0.
In contrast, among the Tsimane we find a quite high j8 
(0.384) for father-son hunting returns, measured as calories 
gained per hour spent foraging. Young Tsimane males are 
likely to go hunting with their fathers (and sometimes other 
male relatives) until they can hunt alone, generally in their 
late teen years. Thus, there is a greater likelihood that a Tsi­
mane hunter had his father as the prime or even only model 
for hunting skills in his formative years than is the case for 
the Ache, and fathers who hunt frequently may be more likely
Table 5. Wealth transmission and inequality measures for hunter-gatherer populations
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Wealth class,4 population Wealth type (N  pairs)
(3 transmission 
coefficient (SE) P value1’ Gini coefficient (SE)
Embodied:
Ache Hunting returns (49) .081 (.273) .768 .237 (.014)
Tsimane Hunting returns (26) .384 (.130) .003 .371 (.037)
Hadza Foraging returns (39) .047 (.193) .808 .339 (.018)
Lamalera Reproductive success (121) .161 (.174) .355 .296 (.012)
Meriam Reproductive success (91) .088 (.247) .722 .298 (.024)
Hadza Grip strength (196) -.044 (.050) .386 .191 (.006)
Ache Weight (137) .509 (.128) .000 .064 (.003)
Hadza Weight (227) .305 (.076) .000 .079 (.002)
Average .164 (.057) .007 .215 (.045)
Material:
Lamalera Boat shares (121) .122 (.093) .190 .474 (.010)
Lamalera Housing quality (121) .218 (.099) .027 .241 (.007)
Average .170 (.106) .119 .357 (.084)
Relational:
Ju/’hoansi Exchange partners (26) .208 (.114) .067 .216 (.028)
Lamalera Sharing partners (119) .251 (.052) .000 .263 (.010)
Average .229 (.106) .038 .229 (.106)
Overall average' .19 (.05) .001 .25 (.04)
“See “Ethnographic Sample and Methods” for explanation of the classes “embodied,” “material,” and “relational.” 
’’Calculated from two-tailed tests of hypothesis that true (3 for a given wealth type or class equals 0.
‘Overall averages computed from the wealth-class averages, weighted by importance (a) of each wealth class (see table 4).
to have sons who actively hunt. Dyads come from four in­
terfluvial Tsimane villages where hunting is fairly common 
because of the low population density and the near proximity 
of remote forest (Gurven, Kaplan, and Gutierrez 2006); since 
local animal densities and other conditions affect hunting- 
return rates, the (3 for Tsimane hunting returns was calculated 
with village dummy variables to control for any possibility 
that we were measuring the effects of correlation in location 
of father-son pairs rather than transmission of ability or skill.
Neither of the (3 values for RS rise to high levels. The lack 
of association between parents’ and children’s RS among La- 
malerans has several possible explanations. One is that co­
operative acquisition of food, followed by food sharing 
between households, tends to reduce differences between 
households in access to food resources. Another possibility is 
that the lack of association is due to generational changes in 
fertility patterns. There is some evidence (D. Nolin, unpub­
lished data) that the age at marriage in Lamalera has increased 
substantially throughout the twentieth century. A secular 
trend toward delayed reproduction and reduced fertility may 
reduce any association between parents’ and children’s RS. 
While crewmen, and especially harpooners, exhibit higher RS 
than do nonhunters (Alvard and Gillespie 2004), any man 
can participate in the fishery. The role of harpooner is nom­
inally heritable, but in practice it can be pursued by any youth 
who shows promise.
Previous research with the Meriam has shown that being 
a turtle hunter, and particularly being a hunt leader, is as­
sociated with greatly elevated age-specific RS (Smith, Bliege 
Bird, and Bird 2003). This RS differential is not found for
Meriam men who have reputations as particularly good fish­
ermen, political leaders, traditional dancers, “ladies’ men,” or 
“hard workers.” Among Meriam women, those with repu­
tations as “hardworking” do have somewhat elevated mean 
RS, but these women are disproportionately married to turtle 
hunters (Smith, Bliege Bird, and Bird 2003). The estimated 
transmission coefficient for Meriam parent-child RS is effec­
tively nil (table 5). This agrees with previous findings that 
pairs of Meriam brothers of roughly the same age in which 
only one is a turtle hunter show the same divergence in RS 
as the full set of Meriam hunters versus nonhunters, and that 
patrilineage does not predict hunting role (Smith, Bliege Bird, 
and Bird 2003). The conclusion seems to be that whatever 
combination of abilities, experience, and motivation leads 
some Meriam men to succeed in turtle hunting or other RS- 
correlated attributes does not tend to be passed from parent 
to offspring. Similarly, differences in female RS in this pop­
ulation do not seem to correlate with parentage. Given the 
relatively egalitarian nature of Meriam social life and the em­
phasis on personal achievement, these results are as might be 
expected. Although the sample size is small (91 pairs, smallest 
of the whole set of 12 RS measures in the project), the low 
(3 value is also found in most other cases where this wealth 
type was measured (see other papers in this special section). 
However, it is intriguing that Hill and Hurtado (1996: 414) 
found a substantial correlation in RS for sons and their par­
ents (but not for daughters); sex-specific transmission of RS 
should be explored in future studies.
Our two (3 measures for body weight show a substantial 
degree of parent-child transmission (about 0.3 for Hadza,
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Figure I. Parent-offspring wealth data for three representative 
cases. A, Ache hunting success (j3 =  0.08, embodied wealth); B, 
Lamalera boat shares (j3 =  0.12, material wealth); C, Ju/’hoansi 
exchange partners (j3 =  0.21, relational wealth). The line in each 
graph shows the underlying linear regression on which the 
estimates are based.
about 0.5 for Ache), the pattern also found in other popu­
lations measured in this project. Given the considerable degree 
of interhousehold food sharing among Ache (Kaplan and Hill 
1985) and Hadza (Sherry and Marlowe 2007) and the low (5 
for Ache hunting success (<0.1), the parent-child weight re­
lationship in these two populations may be substantially due 
to genetic inheritance of disease resistance or some other 
unmeasured variable.
In the category of material wealth, our only two measures 
come from the same population, the whaling village of La­
malera, Indonesia. Household wealth exhibits moderate as­
sociation between parents and children. The index of wealth 
here is based on features of household construction, im­
provements that generally require materials that must be pur­
chased with cash. However, there is very little opportunity 
for wage labor in the village (aside from teaching or a few 
government posts). One way for men (especially young un­
married men) to acquire money is to take occasional tem­
porary construction jobs in the district capitol. However, an­
other important source of cash maybe remittances from other 
close family members who have found permanent jobs outside 
the village. Insofar as both parents and children have access 
to the same sources of remittance money (e.g., from the same 
son/brother), they may manifest similar levels of household 
wealth. !n this case, wealth may be as much an indicator of 
social capital as of material possessions. !n contrast, shares 
that Lamalerans own in whaling-boat {tena) harvests do not 
show a significant intergenerational elasticity, and the esti­
mated effect size is rather small (fig. 1B). This maybe because 
parental influence is less important than more general support 
within one’s lineage for securing shares in the lineage’s tena. 
Other ways of securing boat shares include seeking shares 
from affinal lineages or through repeated, long-term partic­
ipation in the crew of another lineage’s boat. Parental influ­
ence is likely minimal in either case.
Finally, we have two measures of relational wealth. There 
is a moderate relationship (/3~0:2) between Ju/’hoansi par­
ents and offspring in the size of hxaro spheres (fig. 1C). This 
relationship is dependent on two factors. The first is the size 
and strength of spheres of hxaro that parents maintained until 
old age for their children to inherit. Approximately 25% of 
hxaro partnerships were passed from parents to children as 
parents aged or upon their deaths (see “Wealth measures” in 
“Ju/’hoansi”; also Wiessner 1986). The second factor is social 
competence. Some children were competent to “replace” par­
ents who had an active social sphere; others were not. Few 
children of parents with narrow hxaro spheres expanded their 
spheres far beyond those of their parents (i.e., “upward mo­
bility” in hxaro partnerships was infrequent).
The highest |8 value for Lamalera is in food-sharing part­
nerships. Sharing ties are more common between geograph­
ically and genealogically closer households (Nolin 2008). Be­
cause parents and children share a common set of kin, they 
are likely to share many of the same partners, and their total 
number of partners may vary with the number of close kin
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in the village. The tendency for children to reside near their 
parents is mild in Lamalera, but when it does occur parents 
and children are likely to have sharing ties to the same res­
identially close neighbors. Even when children establish 
households farther away, they may maintain sharing rela­
tionships with neighbors near their natal household. Social 
relationships such as food-sharing partnerships differ from 
other types of wealth in that possession by the parents is not 
mutually exclusive of possession by the children. Grown chil­
dren can have established sharing relationships with the same 
households as their parents. In fact, parents may be instru­
mental in helping their children establish these types of social 
relationships as they enter early adulthood (Scelza, forth­
coming).
Wealth Inequality
Although our primary focus in this project is on intergen­
erational wealth transmission, we have an interest in the cor­
responding degree of wealth inequality and how this might 
vary by wealth type, production system, and other factors. 
Table 5 lists the Gini coefficient for each wealth type in our 
sample. We use the Gini because of its wide usage, unit-free 
definition, and intuitive meaning: the coefficient can range 
from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (virtually all wealth held by 
a single household). For comparison, Ginis of monetary in­
come range from about 0.25 in several Scandinavian countries 
to more than 0.6 in some poor countries, with the United 
States at about 0.41 (UNDP 2009). Most Ginis for our 11 
wealth types are in the moderate range, few being less than 
0.1 or greater than 0.4 (table 5); the lowest Ginis are those 
for weight (both <0.1), and the highest is for Lamaleran boat 
shares (0.47). There are too few measures of material and 
relational wealth to discern a pattern by wealth class (but see 
Smith et al. 2010).
To characterize an overall measure of wealth inequality for 
the sample populations, we weight the average Gini coefficient 
for each wealth class (table 5) by the average a  (importance 
for well-being) of that wealth class (table 4). The resulting 
estimate equals 0.25, the same as the simple arithmetic average 
of the Ginis in table 5.
Conclusions
What Shapes Intergenerational Wealth Transfer?
The analyses presented above reveal certain patterns regarding 
wealth (broadly defined) in our sample of hunter-gatherer 
populations. One is that certain types of wealth are more likely 
than others to be transmitted to offspring. Of course, the 
patterns we see could be spurious, given our small number 
of cases. But the replication of some of these patterns across 
populations, and indeed across production systems (as dis­
cussed in other papers in this special section), makes that less 
likely. For example, adult body weight is highly correlated 
between parents and offspring in our two cases, and similar
values in nonforager populations are reported in Gurven et 
al. (2010). Similarly, our two measures of relational wealth, 
involving exchange partners, display moderate values (/3> 
0.2) that are also echoed in most of the other populations 
analyzed in this project (horticultural: Gurven et al. 2010; 
agricultural: Shenk et al. 2010).
Yet similar levels of intergenerational transmission do not 
imply similar causal mechanisms. Weight correlations reflect 
some mix of genetic and environmental causes. With variation 
in food intake effectively muted by the widespread food shar­
ing found in our populations (and most other hunter-gath- 
erers), genetic variation might be free to play a larger role in 
shaping adult weight. In the case of exchange partners, there 
may be some relevant genetic variation (e.g., in determinants 
of personality), but this likely takes a back seat to social and 
demographic variables such as the number of close kin one 
happens to have alive (important for at least the Ju/’hoansi 
case) or the social position of one’s parents.
Some other patterns of wealth transmission are discordant 
between our five populations. The transmission coefficient 
for long-term hunting-return rates is quite high among the 
Tsimane (/3 = 0.38) but close to 0 for the Ache. Since hunting 
success has been found to predict RS in most hunter-gatherer 
populations where the data have been analyzed, including all 
six of the populations treated in this paper (reviewed in 
Gurven and von Rueden 2006; Smith 2004), determining 
whether the Tsimane pattern or the Ache one is more wide­
spread is of considerable interest.
As for RS itself, we treat it here (and elsewhere in this 
special section) as a form of wealth, but it could justifiably 
be considered an outcome of wealth transmission (or con­
sumption) as well, shaped by ecological, political economic, 
and evolutionary factors. In any case, the transmission co­
efficients for our cases are quite low, matching those of most 
of the RS data from other populations analyzed in this special 
section. Interestingly, a recent study analyzing genetic (mi­
tochondrial DNA) data from a set of thirty-seven populations 
concludes that matrilineal fertility inheritance is more fre­
quent in hunter-gatherer populations than in agricultural ones 
(Blum et al. 2006). The authors speculate that in hunter- 
gatherer populations, individuals belonging to large kin net­
works may benefit from stronger social support, resulting in 
more offspring. This hypothesis is consistent with ethno­
graphic analyses of Ju/’hoansi by Draper and Hames (2000) 
and Wiessner (2002), and it links to recent theory about the 
evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding (Clutton- 
Brock 2002; Hrdy 2005; Kokko, Johnstone, and Wright 2002).
How Egalitarian Are Hunter-Gatherers?
Hunter-gatherers have long been anthropology’s favorite ex­
emplar of whatever social, political, or moral principle an 
analyst wishes to support. The twists and turns in this intel­
lectual history have been ably reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Kelly 
1995; Marlowe 2005; Winterhalder 1993). We wish to avoid
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any suggestion of endorsing a new stereotype for what is 
inherently a diverse set of societies. However, we do think 
that our findings support a reassessment of the view that 
hunter-gatherers (with a few obvious exceptions) are char­
acterized by pervasive equality in wealth and life chances.
The intergenerational wealth-transmission coefficients es­
timated here range from values that are very low and statis­
tically indistinguishable from 0 to ones near or above 0.4. Let 
us focus on intermediate values of f3 ~  0.25, close to several 
measures (table 5). While far below a perfect transmission 
rate of 1.0, this measure indicates a fairly high bias in the life 
chances according to the parent’s wealth. Indeed, as detailed 
by Bowles, Smith, and Borgerhoff Mulder (2010), f3 = 0.25 
implies that a child born into the top wealth decile of the 
population is five times as likely to remain in the top wealth 
decile as a child whose parents were in the bottom decile. 
Even a f3 of 0.1 implies that a child born into the top wealth 
decile is twice as likely to remain there as one born into the 
bottom decile. These results suggest that in hunter-gatherer 
populations, even those with extensive food sharing and other 
leveling devices (Cashdan 1980), the offspring of those better 
off will tend to remain so, and conversely.
How much wealth inequality actually exists in these pop­
ulations? The Gini coefficients listed in table 5 are low, com­
pared to those of contemporary societies and even those of 
agricultural and pastoral populations (see other papers in this 
special section), but they are far from negligible. Excluding 
the low coefficients for weight, the Ginis range from ssO.2 to 
~0.5, and even when weight is included the a-weighted av­
erage is 0.25 (table 5). This value is the same as the income 
inequality in contemporary Denmark (0.25), the country with 
lowest such value in recent years (UNDP 2009). Thus, to the 
extent that our measures for this set of foragers are repre­
sentative, wealth inequality is moderate: that is to say, very 
low by current world standards but far from a state of “prim­
itive communism” (cf. Lee 1988).
The combined picture from the intergenerational trans­
mission (f3) and inequality (Gini) estimates suggests that we 
may need to rethink the conventional portrayal of foragers 
as highly egalitarian and unconcerned with wealth. Even clas­
sic examples of hunter-gatherer society display more inequal­
ity than is widely appreciated. For example, evidence indicates 
that leadership was much stronger among the Ju/’hoansi in 
the past, before the Bantu arrived, with the best foraging areas 
(nlore) held by strong families (Wiessner 2002), and the lan­
guage has distinct words for poor, ordinary, and rich.
What Remains to Be Done?
This research raises many more questions than it answers, a 
commonplace that is emphatically true here. Because of space 
limitations, we can mention only the most pressing of these. 
First, we clearly need more wealth measures, particularly for 
material and relational wealth classes. Given the high impor­
tance we assign to relational wealth (a ~  0.4) and the eth­
nographic evidence of its impact on status, this wealth class 
is especially in need of further detailed study and analysis.
Second, we need more work focused on the development 
of institutionalized inequality in hunter-gatherers. For historic 
reasons, there are no extant “complex” foraging societies of 
the sort once found in places such as the Northwest Coast, 
and hence we had no hope of including a representative in 
this project. But the findings reported here do offer potential 
insights into such societies and how they might have devel­
oped (under the right socioecological conditions) from less 
hierarchical systems. In particular, we need to mine the results 
of this project to address the question of what conditions 
allow wealth to be monopolized. We hypothesize that there 
are at least two main differences between establishing in­
equalities on the basis of social ties and doing so via material 
property. First, one can successfully pass on material property 
to a child who is not very bright or competent, and others 
can help him or her manage the advantage, but this is gen­
erally not possible with relational wealth. Second, it is much 
harder to construct institutions to transmit social ties and 
knowledge than to do so for material wealth. To test these 
(and related hypotheses), we will need additional data sets 
detailing the degree of intergenerational wealth transmission 
for various forms of wealth and the processes that support 
or constrain such transmission.
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